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1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that, in the presence of asymmetric information, banks may
retain a proportion of the securities they sell in order to signal asset quality. That is, they
keep a ‘skin in the game’. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) provide a model to show how this
skin in the game is inversely related to asset quality and that the lowest quality asset is
not retained. A number of studies (see, for example, Chen et al., 2008; Demiroglu and
James, 2012) provide empirical evidence supporting the prediction of an inverse relation
between retention and asset quality. On the other hand, Acharya et al. (2009) provides
contradictory evidence that assets with the highest risk (the lowest quality) are nearly
always retained.
Another implication of the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model is that securities sold
will be homogeneous in terms of quality. In particular, DeMarzo (2005) demonstrates
that when sellers have better information about assets than potential buyers, they are
better off selling them separately rather than pooling them together. The intuition is that
pooling reveals no information to buyers – it destroys information, and therefore cannot
be beneficial for sellers. The empirical support for this prediction is mixed. Gorton and
Metrick (2013) find that securities sold are broadly of homogeneous quality. Keys et al.
(2010), on the contrary, suggest that within broad categories of risk, there is considerable
heterogeneity of quality within the securities sold.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model to explain
why assets of low quality might be retained and why the retained securities may involve
assets of varying quality. We do this by allowing for multiple assets and allowing banks
to sell securities as portfolios. We show that as long as banks can commit to the menu
of contracts that they offer to investors, or commit to sell their whole portfolio of assets,
then there are parameter values such that portfolio sales dominate single asset sales and
the securities sold can be of varying and low quality.
We present the model in Section 2. We consider a bank whose assets are a portfolio
of two loans. Loans are sold to investors in a competitive market. All agents are risk
neutral and therefore, prices are equal to the conditional expected value. Each loan can
be either high-quality (high probability of repayment) or low-quality. Returns on the two
loans are assumed to be independently distributed. With two loans and two loan types,
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there are three possible portfolio types: both loans are high quality (a portfolio we label
as H), one is high quality and the other is low quality (M), or both are low quality (L).
As in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), a bank makes profits by collecting fees when offering
loans for sale. The funds the bank obtains from these sales are reinvested in taking on
new loans. There is asymmetric information between sellers and buyers: the bank knows
the quality of each loan on its books but investors cannot observe loan quality at the time
of sale (the bank does not know the loan quality before bringing loans onto its books).
Since there is asymmetric information, the bank may wish to signal the quality of loans
by retaining a fraction of the loan on its books along the lines suggested by DeMarzo and
Duffie (1999).
In Section 3 we replicate a result of DeMarzo (2005) that, other things being equal,
banks are better off selling loans separately rather than selling them together as a port-
folio (see Proposition 1). The intuition for this result is straightforward. Selling loans
singly requires only one signal: that a loan is high quality. Selling loans as a portfolio
requires two signals to distinguish the three portfolio types. Since signaling is costly, it is
preferable to sell loans singly. Although this result can be found in DeMarzo (2005) and
is straightforward, we present it in detail because it aids the understanding of subsequent
results.
Section 4 extends the analysis by allowing banks to pool together a mix of two of the
three possible portfolios. It presents our main result (Theorem 1) that describes when
pooling a mix of two portfolios is optimal.2 The advantage of pooling two portfolios is that
it requires only one signal, reducing signaling costs compared to signaling three types of
portfolio. It may also be preferable to selling loans singly. For example, pooling together
portfolios M and L involves a signal only if both loans are of high quality, whereas selling
the loans singly requires a signal even when only one of the loans is of high quality. There
is however, a disadvantage for the bank in pooling a mix of portfolios. Using a mix of
portfolios changes the incentive constraints that must be satisfied for a signaling strategy
to be credible. This may increase the cost of the required signal. We show that if the fee
is high, then the bank will prefer to sell the loans together. If the fee is low, then the
2 Note that pooling here is used in the sense of game theory and does not mean that the bank is creating
a new security.
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bank prefers to retain the high quality loan than to mix portfolios and, thus, it will sell
loans singly. For intermediate values of the fee, the bank finds it optimal to pool a mix
of the portfolios M and L or a mix of the portfolios H and L.
It may seem odd that a bank may wish to pool portfolios H and L. However, the skin
in game increases with the difference in the quality between the two assets. The difference
between the expected payoff from pooling the two portfolios H (two high quality loans)
and L (two two quality loans) compared with the expected payoff from portfolio M (one
low quality and one high quality loan) is relatively small. Thus, the bank can signal the
difference by retaining only a small fraction of the pooled portfolio. When this is optimal,
the fraction retained by the bank may include low quality loans. Taking an average
over banks, the retained asset will include both high and low quality loans. Theorem 1
describes parameter values for which this is indeed optimal.
In addition to accounting for some observed retention strategies that are unexplained
by DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), our model also delivers a novel prediction about how
retention strategies change in response to uncertainty. During periods of increased uncer-
tainty, it predicts that banks are more likely to use pooling strategies. That is, securities
sold are more heterogeneous in periods of increased uncertainty. In Section 4, we explain
in more detail the derivation of this prediction and suggest how it might be empirically
tested.
Our paper is closely related to other work on signaling that builds upon the seminal
work of Leland and Pyle (1977). This literature includes DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)
and DeMarzo (2005) mentioned above. DeMarzo (2005) starts from a similar premise
to our paper, namely that in the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model, banks prefer to sell
securities singly rather than as portfolios. DeMarzo (2005) shows that banks may benefit
from designing new securities that pool assets into tranches. In particular, banks can
tranche securities into a risk-free, senior security and a residual ‘equity’ claim where all
the default risk is concentrated. This strategy has the advantage that it ameliorates the
lemons problem for the risk-free tranche, enabling banks to sell loans at a higher average
price. In our model, there are only two states and in the bad state both loans return
nothing. With this assumption, it is not possible to tranche assets in the way done by
DeMarzo (2005). The DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model has also been extended to a
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dynamic environment by Hartman-Glaser (2017) (see also Page`s, 2013). Hartman-Glaser
(2017) shows that banks build a reputation over time that mitigates the power of retention
as a signaling device. Although our main result applies to the single-period model, we
discuss how it might be extended to a multiple-period context in Section 5. Our model
does require some form of commitment (either to a menu of contracts or to stand ready to
sell the whole portfolio) by the seller. We are not the first to use commitment to analyze
securitization and portfolio sales. Gorton and Souleles (2007) argue that the willingness
of banks to subsidize special purpose vehicles by buying back low quality assets, a type
of ‘implicit recourse’, can be interpreted as a form of commitment. In our model, the
commitment of banks to a menu of contracts plays a similar role.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives
a preliminary result, similar to DeMarzo (2005), that compares single asset sales and
portfolio sales. The main result of the paper is derived in Section 4. Section 5 considers
how the model might be extended to multiple rounds of sales and Section 6 analyzes an
alternative form of commitment. We offer some final comments in Section 7. Proofs not
given in the text are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model
The economy lasts for one period and consists of banks and investors. All agents are
risk-neutral. Banks are identical and we can focus the analysis on the behavior of a single
bank. At the beginning of the period, the bank offers loans of unit size to finance two risky
projects. There are two types of loans. Loans of type j ∈ {h, l} repay R with probability
pij and fail to repay anything with probability 1 − pij; where pih > pil. We assume that
both types of loans have positive net present value; βpilR > 1, where the discount factor
β captures the time preference, common to all agents. Let θ denote the probability that
a loan is of type h. Loan types are independently distributed. Let ψ := θpih + (1 − θ)pil
be the unconditional probability that a loan repays R. The unconditional probability
is relevant both for investors, who do not know the loan type, and for the bank when
taking new loans onto its books. With two loans there are three portfolio types. With
probability θ2 both loans are of type h (portfolio H); with probability (1− θ)2 both loans
are of type l (portfolio L) and with probability 2θ(1− θ) one of the loans is of type h and
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the other loan is of type l (portfolio M). The probability θ and the size of the bank’s
portfolio are common knowledge to the bank and investors.
We assume that at the beginning of the period, before the bank learns its portfolio
type, it commits to a set of contracts for selling its portfolio to investors. We will show that
this commitment maximizes the bank’s ex ante payoff, allowing it to use a pooling sales
strategy. Commitment is required because such strategies will not necessarily maximize
the bank’s ex post payoff once it has learned its portfolio type. We will demonstrate that
this commitment can explain the banks sells its loans as portfolios but do not necessarily
pool together all loans. After the announcement of sales contracts, the bank learns the
types of its loans (and, as a consequence, the type of its portfolio).3 This information is
private. At this point, the bank can either keep the loans on its books or it can try to sell
them to investors. This market for loans is assumed to be competitive. If sold, the bank
can finance new loans. The bank collects a fee f when it signs a new loan agreement. The
role of the fee, as in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), is as a devise to generate trade between
the bank and outside investors at the start of the trading period. The bank can also
choose between selling the whole portfolio and single loan sales. When the bank keeps
a loan on its books, it has to wait until the end of the period to receive a payoff. In
contrast, when the bank sells the loan and uses the proceeds to make new loans it collects
fees at the beginning of the period and purchases a new loan of unknown type. Define
φ := f+βψR to be the expected discounted payoff the bank anticipates from selling a unit
of loan: the arrangement fee from the new loan plus the expected discounted return from
the new loan. By assumption φ > 1. Investors observe the size of the bank’s portfolio
and its retention strategies but observe neither loan nor portfolio types.
Since investors do not observe the type of a loan, there is a lemons problem. The
maximum amount that investors are willing to pay for a loan is βpilR because if they offer
to pay βψR (the expected loan payoff), then the bank will only sell l type loans. Since
keeping a loan on its books is costly in terms of the fees forgone, the bank might be able
3 The lag between the announcement and the learning of types captures the period during which the
bank learns the type of its portfolio (prime, sub-prime, etc.). The assumption that the bank knows the
type of loans on its books after purchase but does not know the loan type at the time it brings loans onto
its books is clearly an extreme one. It is however, meant to capture the idea that the bank has better
information after it has kept a loan on its books for a while.
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to use a retention strategy, that is, keeping a fraction of a loan on its books as skin in
the game, to signal the quality of the loan to investors. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) show
that the skin in the game, dq, for a given asset quality q, is given by
dq =
φ
(
pq
pq−
− 1
)
+ dq
−
(φ− 1)
φ
(
pq
pq−
)
− 1
(1)
where q− denotes the quality one level below q, and pq and pq− denote the competitive
prices of the corresponding assets. Furthermore, when q− is the lowest quality level, then
dq
−
= 0: the lowest quality is not retained. The equation will be explained more fully in
the next section. Essentially, the higher the quality of the loan, the lower is the cost of
retaining it on the books. Therefore, banks signal quality by keeping a skin in the game
that is inversely related to loan quality.
3. Single Loans and Portfolio Sales
In this section, we compare single loan sales and portfolio sales. We present a key
benchmark result that in the absence of commitment, single loan sales dominate. This
result was established by DeMarzo (2005). Given that our set-up is different from De-
Marzo (2005), we go through the analysis in detail because it will help to understand the
mixed pooling and signaling case presented in Section 4.
3.1. Single Loan Sales
In this subsection, we assume that the bank sells loans singly. An equilibrium may
be either pooling or separating. First, consider a separating equilibrium. Let dj denote
the fraction of a loan of type j that the bank is supposed to keep on its books and let
pj denote the price of a loan of type j. The profit to the bank with a loan of type i of
retaining a fraction dj of the loan on its books is:
Uij := d
jβpiiR + (1− dj)pjφ.
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The first term is the bank’s expected payoff from keeping on its books a fraction dj of the
loan that has a success probability of pii. The second term is the sales revenues (1− dj)pj
from the fraction of the loan not retained times the expected discounted payoff the bank
anticipates from selling a unit of loan φ = f + ψβR: that is, the arrangement fee f from
the new loan plus the expected discounted return from the new loan ψβR. Here the
expected repayment probability of new loans is ψ because at the point of purchase the
bank is uncertain about the loan type.
The maximum price that an investor will pay for a loan of type j is βpijR: that is, the
loan’s discounted expected payoff. Given that the market for loans is competitive, the
price of loans will be bid up to this maximum value:
pj = βpijR for each j. (2)
Lemma 1. Under a separating equilibrium of prices and retention strategies with single
loan sales:
pl = βpilR, ph = βpihR,
dl = 0, dh = dˆh :=
φ
(
ph
pl
− 1
)
φ
(
ph
pl
)
− 1
=
φ (pih − pil)
φpih − pil . (3)
The expression for dh in equation (3) is the skin in the game retained by the bank to
signal that the loan is high quality. Since φ > 1 and pih > pil, d
h ∈ (0, 1). The intuition
for the result is quite straightforward. Since φ > 1 and the price received is given by (2),
the bank will prefer, ceteris paribus , to sell a loan rather than retain it. With two loans
each of two types and, hence, three portfolio types, there are six incentive constraints to
ensure that the payoff from selling the loans according to the true portfolio type is no
less than the payoff from selling the loans as one of the other two portfolio types. Despite
there being six incentive constraints, it can be shown that the two relevant constraints
are that the bank with portfolio H (two loans of type h) prefers not to sell it as a portfolio
L (two loans of type l) and vice-versa. If these two constraints are satisfied, then so are
all the others (see the appendix for the full proof). This means that the analysis of the
single loans case is identical to the case where the bank has only one loan that can be of
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either high or low type. First, it is clear that there is no advantage to have dl > 0 because
signaling is costly. Therefore, for the bank selling all of its low type loan, its expected
payoff is Ull = plφ. Whereas, if it retains a fraction d
h and receives a price ph = βpihR for
the loans sold, its expected payoff is Ulh = d
hβpilR + (1 − dh)phφ = dhpl + (1 − dh)phφ,
since the value of the loans retained is pl. Incentive compatibility requires both Ull ≥ Ulh
and Uhh ≥ Uhl. Combining these two conditions gives
dhph ≥
(
pl − (1− dh)ph
)
φ ≥ dhpl. (4)
Equivalently,
(ph − pl)φ
ph(φ− 1) ≥ dh ≥
(ph − pl)φ
phφ− pl .
It is clear that the most relevant constraint is that the bank should not wish to sell a low
type loan as a high type. This is the second inequality in (4). Where it is satisfied as
equality (Ull = Ulh), the value of d
h is given by equation (3) in Lemma 1. An increase
in φ reduces the required retention rate dˆh because the cost of signaling is increased. A
rise in the ratio of pih/pil has the opposite effect because it makes passing off low quality
loans as high quality more tempting and therefore the required retention rate to signal
high quality increases.
In principle, any prices satisfying (2) and dh satisfying (4) can be supported as a
separating equilibrium with investor beliefs that retention d < dh corresponds to a low
quality loan and any d ≥ dh comes from a high quality loan. However, as is standard, the
separating equilibrium of Lemma 1 is the Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium that
also satisfies the intuitive criterion. To see this, suppose that dh satisfies (4) and dh > dˆh.
A bank with a low type loan will never choose such a dh. Thus, investors believe that any
such deviation to a lower dh must come from a high type and therefore can be sold for
the high price ph. Given that the bank’s payoff decreases with dh, the amount retained
will be decreased until dh = dˆh.
Now, we consider the possibility of a pooling equilibrium. This requires that the
bank has some form of commitment to a selling strategy before it knows its portfolio
type. We suppose that the bank can commit to a menu of contracts conditional on sales
taking place. We view the commitment as a short cut to modeling repeated interactions
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that might generate similar effects endogenously. We will consider a model with repeated
interactions in Section 5. In Section 6, we will consider an alternative form of commitment
(which will turn out to be a stronger form of commitment) in which the bank commits to
a menu of contracts with each investor separately, but also commits to stand ready to sell
all its loans. In a pooling equilibrium, the bank will not keep any fraction of the loan on
its books given that retention is only beneficial if it can be used as a signal. Competition
among investors means that in this case the price of loan sales is bid up to βψR. For
this to be an equilibrium, the bank must prefer to sell its loans rather than retaining
them. For a loan of type l, the bank’s expected payoff from sales is φβψR compared with
βpilR from retention. Since φ > 1 and ψ > pil, it follows that sales are always better
than retention. On the other hand, if the bank sells a high quality loan to investors, its
payoff will be φβψR compared to βpihR from retention. Therefore, if φψ < pih the bank
would prefer to keep the high quality loan on its books rather than earning the pooling
payoff. Thus, pooling cannot be an equilibrium when φψ < pih. That is, when φ is low,
in particular, when the fee f is low, the bank will sell the loans to investors individually,
using the skin in the game as a signal.
Now, consider the case when φψ ≥ pih, that is when φ, and in particular the fee f , is
high. The bank’s ex ante payoff from pooling, VP , is given by the value of selling all loans
at the price of βψR:
VP = 2φβψR.
The bank’s ex ante payoff from signaling when the loans are sold separately, VS, is com-
puted as the weighted average of the payoff to each of the three possible portfolio types.
Letting ρH := θ
2, ρM := 2θ(1 − θ) and ρL := (1 − θ)2, the ex ante payoff from signaling
is given by
VS = ρH2βpihR
(
dh + φ
(
1− dh))+ ρM (βpihR (dh + φ (1− dh))+βpilRφ)+ ρL2βpilRφ
(5)
Comparing the two payoffs we find that
VP − VS = 2θpihβR (φ− 1) dh > 0.
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This is not surprising given that signaling is costly. Thus, as long as pooling is feasible
and the bank can commit to a selling strategy, the bank will pool to sell its loans. When
pooling is not feasible, the bank uses costly signaling. In summary:
Lemma 2. Suppose that the bank sells each loan separately to investors. Then,
1. If φ < pih
ψ
, then the bank will sell the loans using signaling.
2. If φ ≥ pih
ψ
, then the bank will sell the loans using pooling.
3.2. Portfolio Sales
Now we allow the bank to bundle the two loans and sell them as a portfolio. The
analysis of portfolio sales follows closely the one above for single loan sales. Let di denote
the fraction of a portfolio of type i (i = H,M,L) that the bank keeps on its books. The
maximum prices, that an investor will pay for portfolios of type H, M and L are equal to
2βpihR, β(pih + pil)R and 2βpilR, respectively, which correspond to the expected payoffs
of these portfolios. To simplify notation, let pim := (1/2)(pih + pil). The following results
can be established.4
Lemma 3. Under a separating equilibrium of prices and retention strategies with portfolio
loan sales:
pL = βpilR, pM = βpimR, pH = βpiHR, d
L = 0,
dM = dˆM :=
φ
(
pim
pil
− 1
)
φ
(
pim
pil
)
− 1
,
and
dH = dˆH :=
φ
(
pih
pim
− 1
)
+ dM (φ− 1)
φ
(
pih
pim
)
− 1
,
where dˆH > dˆM .
4 The proofs of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are provided in a Supplementary Appendix.
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With three types of portfolios, the bank needs two signals to separate them. As stated
in equation (1), the skin in the game is decreasing with asset quality. It is also easy to
establish that Lemma 2 also applies to portfolio sales as well as sales on individual loans.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the bank can either keep the portfolios on its books or sell them
to investors. Then,
1. If φ < pih
ψ
, then the bank will sell the portfolios to investors using signaling,
2. If φ ≥ pih
ψ
, then the bank will sell the portfolios to investors using pooling.
As for the case of single loan sales, costly signaling is only used when pooling generates
a lower expected payoff.
The next result compares Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 to determine whether the bank will
sell the loans separately or as a portfolio (proof in the Appendix). It reproduces the result
from DeMarzo (2005) that the bank will prefer to sell loans singly to investors rather than
as a pool of loans. The intuition is straightforward. When the bank sells the loans singly,
there are only two types to be separated. In contrast, when the bank sells them as a pool,
there are three portfolio types to be separated. Given that signaling is costly, it is better
to sell loans singly.
Proposition 1 (DeMarzo (2005)). Suppose that the bank can sell the loans either singly
or as a portfolio. Then, the bank will sell them singly to investors.
This result is an important benchmark. The fact that a bank has multiple loans does
not in itself provide an explanation for why banks may prefer to sell portfolios of loans.
4. Mixed Pooling and Signaling
DeMarzo (2005) offers an explanation for why banks may sell portfolios of loans. His
explanation is that banks can repackage loans into tranches of differing risk categories. By
creating a tranche that is risk free, a bank ameliorates the lemons problem for this tranche
enabling it to sell loans at a higher average price. As mentioned in the Introduction, this
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option is not feasible in our model because a risk-free tranche cannot be created when the
minimum payoff from each loan type is zero.
We offer an alternative explanation for why banks may pool loans and retain a pro-
portion of loans on their books. In particular, we consider a sales strategy that involves a
mix of pooling portfolios and signaling. Since there are three portfolio types in our model,
we consider the case where a bank pools two of these potential portfolios. The advantage
of such a strategy is that the bank will only have to separate two portfolios, the mixed
portfolio and the unmixed portfolio, and therefore, will use only one signal.
There are three potential portfolios mixes: a pool of portfolios H and M, which we
label as HM, a pool of portfolios H and L (HL) and a pool of portfolios M and L (ML).
For example, a sales strategy mix ML means that when the bank’s portfolio is type H, the
bank signals it by using skin in the game and, thus, separates it from the other two types,
namely, M and L; But, when its portfolio is type M, it does not use skin in the game as
a signal and, thus, does not separate the type M portfolio from the type L portfolio.
To calculate the skin in the game required for each mix let
piij :=
ρipii + ρjpij
ρi + ρj
denote the conditional probability of the successful outcome if the portfolio mix is ij,
where i ∈ {H,M} and j ∈ {M,L}, i 6= j.5 It follows straightforwardly (since ψ R pim
and piHL R ψ for θ R 1/2) that piHM > pil, pih > piML and piHL R pim as θ R 1/2. The
expected discounted value, per share, of the portfolio mix ij is therefore βpiijR.
Since prices are competitive, the sale of the mix ij will yield a payoff to the bank of
φβpiijR. This is to be compared to a payoff from retaining the higher quality portfolio of
βpiiR. If the bank can commit to a selling strategy, as discussed in the previous section,
then it will prefer to retain the higher quality portfolio than the mix provided pii > φpiij.
5 Note there is some abuse of notation here. The pii on the right hand side of the formula should be pih
or pim depending on whether the portfolio is i = H or i = M respectively.
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Thus, a necessary condition for the mixed portfolio ij to be sold is
φpiij ≥ pii.
As we have seen in the previous section, signaling requires that the bank retain a fraction
of the higher quality asset on its books. For the mixed portfolio HM, this means retaining
a fraction of the portfolio HM. For the mixed portfolio ML, it means retaining a fraction
of the high quality loan. For the mixed portfolio HL, what is retained depends on the
proportion of high quality and low quality loans. If θ > 1/2, then the mix HL has more of
the higher quality loans on average than portfolio M and the mix HL is the higher quality
asset which may be retained as a signal. If θ < 1/2, then the reverse is true and the
portolio M is the higher quality asset that may be retained as a signal. If θ = 1/2, then
there is no need to signal because the mix of portfolios H and L is exactly equivalent to
portfolio M. Let dij denote the fraction of the higher quality asset retained on the bank’s
books to signal the portfolio mix ij and Uij the corresponding expected payoff. It can be
checked that
UHM = 2
(
(ρH + ρM)
(
dHM + φ(1− dHM)) βpiHMR + ρLφβpilR) ,
UHL =
2
(
(ρH + ρL)
(
dHL + φ(1− dHL)) βpiHLR + ρMφβpimR) for θ > 12
2
(
ρM
(
dHL + φ(1− dHL)) βpimR + (ρH + ρL)φβpiHLR) for θ < 12 , (6)
UML = 2
(
ρH
(
dML + φ(1− dML)) βpihR + (ρM + ρL)φβpiMLR) .
Then, using exactly the same steps as for the case of single loan sales, it can be shown
that the skin in the game is given by dij = dˆij where
dˆHM :=
φ (piHM − pil)
φpiHM − pil ; dˆ
HL :=

φ(piHL−pim)
φpiHL−pim for θ >
1
2
φ(pim−piHL)
φpim−piHL for θ <
1
2
;
dˆML :=
φ (pih − piML)
φpih − piML . (7)
4.1. Feasible Sales Strategies of Mixed Pooling and Signaling
Having established the retention strategies for each portfolio mix, we can turn to
consider the feasibility of sale of each portfolio mix. Recall that if φψ ≥ pih, then the bank
will prefer to pool and sell the whole portfolio to the market. When φψ < pih, the bank
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will use signaling and may sell the loans separately or may pool two of the three potential
portfolios. In the next proposition, we identify sales strategies that are feasible and in
the subsequent theorem (next subsection) we show which among the feasible strategies
maximize the bank’s payoff.
Proposition 2. [Feasible Mixed Pooling and Signaling Strategies]
1. A pooled mix of portfolios H and M is feasible when pih
piHM
< φ 6 pih
ψ
.
2. A pooled mix of portfolios H and L is feasible when θ > 1
2
and pih
piHL
< φ 6 pih
ψ
.
3. A pooled mix of portfolios M and L is feasible when pim
piML
< φ 6 pih
ψ
.
Proposition 2 identifies parameter restrictions such that mixed pooling and signaling
strategies are feasible. In comparison with single asset sales, each of these new strategies
must satisfy an additional incentive constraint. When the bank pools two of the portfolios
together, its payoff must be higher than what it could obtain by keeping the higher quality
portfolio in its books.
4.2. Optimal Sales Strategies
In comparing single loan sales and sales that use mixed pooling and signaling, the
bank’s payoff from individuals sales is given by VS in equation (5). Comparing VS with
the utilities derived from mixed pooling and signaling and comparing the mixed pooling
strategies HL and ML, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 1. [Optimal Sales Strategies]
1. If φ < pim
piML
, then the bank will sell the loans singly to investors using signaling,
2. If pim
piML
≤ φ < min
{
pih
ψ
, pih
piHL
}
, then the bank will pool portfolios M and L,
3. If pih
piHL
≤ φ < pih
ψ
, then the bank will choose either to pool portfolios H and L or pool
portfolios M and L. For θ ∈ (1/2, (pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil)), the bank will pool portfolios
H and L. For larger values of θ, there is a critical φc(θ) ∈ (pih/piHL, pih/ψ) such
that the bank chooses to pool portfolio H and L for φ > φc(θ) and chooses to pool
portfolios M and L for φ < φc(θ).
4. If φ > pih
ψ
, then the bank will sell the loans to investors using pooling.
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Proposition 2 identifies parameter values such that mixed pooling strategies are feasi-
ble. Theorem 1 shows which strategies are most profitable for different parameter values.
It says that pooling the mix of portfolios H and L, or the mix of portfolios M and L, can
be optimal. The intuition is as follows. First compare dˆh from equation (3) with dˆML
from equation (7). It can be checked that dˆML < dˆh: the skin in the game for the mixed
portfolio is lower because it is only required if both loans are of high quality, whereas, if
loans are sold separately, the skin in the game is required whenever the bank has a high
quality loan. Similarly, for θ ≥ 1/2, it can be checked that dˆHL < dˆh because the skin
in the game for the portfolio HL is only required if both loans are of the same type (for
θ < 1/2, the mixed portfolio HL will not be used because it will be dominated by pooling
all portfolios). Furthermore, it can be shown that the mixed portfolio HM is never used
because it is always dominated by separate loan sales. In particular, the reduction in the
cost of signaling the portfolio HM, relative to the cost of signaling the high-quality asset,
is not sufficient to compensate for the decline in the value of the pooled portfolio relative
to the value of the high-quality asset. In comparing the two mixes HL with ML, it can be
shown that dˆHL < dˆML. However, HL requires a skin in the game whenever both loans
are of the same quality, whereas the mixed portfolio ML requires a skin in the game only
when both loans are of high quality. Whether the mix HL or the mix ML dominates, will
depend on the loan mix.6 A larger value of φ decreases the skin in the game required for
both portfolio mixes but this effect can be shown to benefit HL relatively more than ML.7
We conclude from Theorem 1 that, for certain parameter values, the mix of portfolios H
6 For θ close to 1/2, the skin in the game required for the portfolio HL will be small whereas the skin
in the game for ML remains non-negligible, and hence, the portfolio HL dominates. For θ close to 1, the
difference in the skin in the game is smaller but the probability that both loans are low quality becomes
smaller faster and again the portfolio HL dominates. For intermediate values of θ, whether HL dominates
or not depends on the parameter configuration of φ, pih and pil.
7 It is shown in the Appendix that a sufficient condition for HL to dominate ML is φ > φc where
φc = 1 +
(pih − pil)
(√
pih(pih + pil)− pih
)
2pi2h
.
It can be checked that φc < 2pih/(pih + pil) and therefore, there is a non-empty set of parameter values
θ ≥ 1/2 and pih > pil such that φ > φc and pih/piHL ≤ φ < pih/ψ. It can be shown that φc ≤
(10+7
√
7)/27 ≈ 1.0563059. Since φ = f+βψR and βpilR > 1, the fee required on sales for this condition
to be satisfied is quite low.
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and L is used, which means that low quality loans may be retained by the bank in line
with the observation of Acharya et al. (2009). Averaging across banks, a mix of high and
low quality loans will be retained. This is in line with the evidence of Keys et al. (2010).
Theorem 1 also sheds some light on how the use of pooling strategies respond to
changes in the fee and the interest rate spread. The fee f is directly related to φ. The
return R is a good proxy for the interest spread, given that the size of each loan is equal
to 1. Some recent studies find that both the fee and the spread are countercyclical.
For example, Berg et al. (2016) find that higher upfront fees are more likely in periods
of higher volatility in profitability, when it is more likely that borrowers will draw down
their credit lines, and Walentin (2014) documents the countercyclicality of spreads. Given
this observed countercyclicality of spreads and fees, Theorem 1 implies that during times
of financial turmoil, e.g., 2007-08 global financial crisis, the use of pooling strategies
increases. In particular, an implication of our model is that the within portfolio variability
of the distribution of predicted default rates (e.g., fico rates for mortgages) increases with
the financial volatility.
This implication is, in principle, empirically testable. Testing this implication would
require information not only about the portfolios that banks manage but also about the
assets that composed those portfolios. There are many data sets containing ratings for
individual loans issued over a number of years and also data sets offering information
about CDOs. However, what is required is not just information about the tranches, but
also information about the whole portfolios from where the tranches were created. To our
knowledge, only Faltin-Traeger and Mayer (2012) use a data set with information about
both portfolios and the assets that composed those portfolios. Unfortunately, that data
set covers only the period 2005-07 and therefore is not useful for testing the implications
of our model because it does not cover the period of the financial crisis.
5. Multiple Sales Rounds
So far, we have considered only one round of sales. In reality, banks keep recycling
their assets by selling new loans and using the proceeds to offer new ones. In this section,
we demonstrate how the analysis might be extended to multiple rounds.
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When we consider multiple rounds we face two related problems: Firstly, there is an
‘integer problem’ related to the number of new loans and, secondly, there are complications
in deriving the composition of subsequent portfolios. We avoid these problems, in this
section, by considering the case where the portfolio consists of a continuum of assets.
Since sales of individual assets are not feasible, we concentrate on portfolio sales and
consider only complete separation of portfolio types. In particular, suppose that in each
round the portfolio can only be one of the following three types: (a) all loans low quality
(probability ρL); (b) all loans high quality (probability ρH) and (c) half the loans low
quality and half the loans high quality (probability ρM). This has a close correspondence
to the one-period model we have previously considered, but here we restrict the portfolio
types in a very arbitrary way. To simplify the exposition, we assume that there are two
sub-periods. The multiple rounds of sales take place during the first sub-period, which
is very short (no discounting between rounds). At the end of the second sub-period, all
loans mature. The idea we try to capture is that the securitization process is very short
relative to the duration of loan contracts. With this setting, the bank faces exactly the
same problem in each round (only the size of the portfolio changes) and, therefore, the
skin in the game will not vary.
As before, let di denote the fraction of a portfolio of type i (i = H,M,L) that the
bank keeps on its books. Since markets are competitive, both sold and retained loans are
priced at their expected value, Thus, the bank’s payoff from the first round V 1i is given
by the value of the retained loans plus the per unit fee f times the value of loans sold,
that is,
V 1i = d
ipi + f
(
1− di) pi.
Let
W := ρHpHd
H + ρLpLd
L + ρMpMd
M ,
and
Z := ρH
(
1− dH) pH + ρL (1− dL) pL + ρM (1− dM) pM .
The term W is the expected value of loans to be retained in the next round and Z is the
expected value of loans to be sold in the next round. We will restrict our attention to
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problems that satisfy the restriction Z < 1.8 The bank’s expected payoff from the second
round can be shown to be given by
V 2i = (1− di)pi(W + fZ),
and the expected payoff from the third round is
V 3i = (1− di)pi(W + fZ)Z.
Then, by induction, we have, for T ≥ 2
V Ti =
(
1− di) pi (W + fZ)ZT−2.
Adding the payoffs for all periods, we find that the bank’s total expected payoff from
portfolio i is equal to
∑∞
t=0
(
dipi +
(
1− di) pi [f + (W + fZ)Zt]) = dipi + (1− di) pi(f + W + fZ
1− Z
)
.
This expression can be compared with the corresponding expression for single round sales:
dipi+(1− di) pi(f +βψR). The difference between these expressions is that the last term
includes future fees and retention rates from subsequent rounds. We can, therefore, follow
the same steps as those in the previous section of the paper using these modified payoff
functions. Conceptually, the problem is identical but technically it is more complicated
since the terms W and Z are functions of di.
In the above example, we have restricted our attention to complete separation strate-
gies. By following the same steps as in the last section, we can extend the analysis to
portfolios. In principle, the method is simple, but the derivations can quickly become very
complicated, especially as the number of asset types, and consequently portfolio types,
increase. This complexity may, in itself, be costly and perhaps suggests an explanation
for one of the puzzling questions that Gorton and Metrick (2013) have raised in relation
8 An upper bound for Z is βψR, which is greater than one. Thus the assumption Z < 1 requires that
the skin in the game is significant enough. If Z ≥ 1, then the value of the bank’s sales becomes infinite.
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to securitization; in their own words “The choice of loans to pool and sell to the SPV also
remains a puzzle. Existing theories cannot address why securitized-loan pools are homo-
geneous – all credit cards or all prime mortgages, for example.” The costs of complexity
mean it may better to keep securitized-loan pools homogenous.
6. An Alternative Commitment Strategy
For pooling to be credible, some commitment by the bank to a selling strategy is
required. So far, we have assumed that the bank can commit to a menu of contracts
conditional on sales taking place. In this section, we modify this assumption and suppose
the bank simply commits to a menu of contracts with each investor separately. Thus, the
bank can make credible agreements to individual investors about the contracts that it
will use in future sales but cannot credibly commit to use the same contracts with other
investors. We also assume that the bank commits to stand ready to sell all its loans.
We demonstrate that pooling equilibria are also feasible in this case and, in particular,
that this form of commitment is stronger than that assumed in Section 2. We are going
to concentrate on the case of single sales because it is easier to analyze. It will become
clear that a similar argument applies to the case of portfolio sales.
Since we want to show that pooling is feasible, we consider the situation where the bank
commits to offer a pooling contract to only one of the investors while using the signaling
mechanism to sell the other loan to a another investor. If the bank has a portfolio M, it
would wish to sell the low quality loan to the first investor using the pooling contract (at
the average price) and sell the high quality loan to the second investor using the retention
strategy dh. The bank’s expected (ex ante) payoff from this second contract is given by:
(ρH + ρM) βpihR
(
dh + φ
(
1− dh))+ ρLβpilRφ
Given that such a strategy involves the bank selling a loan of low quality at the average
price when it has portfolio M, investors would only accept the pooling contract if they are
convinced that the bank has an incentive to offer the same contract to all other investors.
Then, because of the commitment to stand ready to sell all its assets, the bank will not
use the strategy, provided that it is no worse off selling its loan at the average price. This
20
is true when
(ρH + ρM) βpihR
(
dh + φ
(
1− dh))+ ρLβpilRφ ≤ βψRφ.
With dh given in equation (3) and ψ = θpih + (1− θ)pil, this inequality can be simplified
to
φ ≥ (2− θ)pih − (1− θ) pil
pih
. (8)
Inequality (8) says that provided φ is high enough (equivalently the fee f is high enough),
offering the pooling contract to all investors is incentive compatible. Recall from Lemma 2,
that the pooling equilibrium exists when φ ≥ pih/ψ. It is easy to check that
pih
ψ
≥ (2− θ) pih − (1− θ) pil
pih
with equality only when θ = 1. Thus, inequality (8) shows that the commitment consid-
ered in this section is stronger than the commitment assumed in previous sections (there
are some additional parameter values where pooling is feasible) because of the commit-
ment of the bank to sell its whole portfolio, even though it does not commit to offer the
same contract to all investors. Some commitment by thee bank is, however, needed be-
cause if the bank were completely unable to make any commitments, then pooling would
not be credible.
7. Conclusion
We have extended the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) signaling model from single sales of
risky assets to portfolio sales. We have identified conditions under which signaling at the
portfolio level dominates signaling at the single asset level. It has also been shown that
the optimal mix of retained assets can involve both high and low quality loans.
In order to keep the analysis simple, we have assumed that banks hold only two
uncorrelated loans, which can be one of two types, high or low quality. We comment
briefly on the robustness of the model. If there are more than two loans, then the number
of potential portfolios increases and there are more possible mixed portfolios to consider
but the analysis is not fundamentally changed. Similarly, if there are more than two types
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of loan, there are more potential portfolios and more qualities to signal but the result that
lower quality assets are retained is unlikely to change. Equally, as long as the returns are
not perfectly correlated across loan types, the motivation for pooling of portfolios remains
and, qualitatively, the nature of our result will be unchanged.
8. Appendix
8.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1 Any solution that satisfies (IC2) and (IC6) will also satisfy (IC1), (IC3), (IC4)
and (IC5).
Proof There are six incentive compatibility constraints.
2
(
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) ph ) ≥ βdhpihR + φ (1− dh) ph + βdlpihR + φ (1− dl) pl
(IC1)
2
(
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) ph ) ≥ 2 (βdlpihR + φ (1− dl) pl) (IC2)
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) ph + βdlpilR + φ (1− dl) pl ≥ βdhpihR + βdhpilR + 2φ (1− dh) ph
(IC3)
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) ph + βdlpilR + φ (1− dl) pl ≥ βdlpihR + βdlpilR + 2φ (1− dl) pl
(IC4)
2
(
βdlpilR + φ
(
1− dl) pl) ≥ βdhpilR + φ (1− dh) ph + βdlpilR + φ (1− dl) pl
(IC5)
2
(
βdlpilR + φ
(
1− dl) pl) ≥ 2 (βdhpilR + φ (1− dh) ph) (IC6)
(IC1) states that when the portfolio type is H the bank prefers to sell each loan as
type h rather than one loan as type h and the other as type l. (IC2) states that
when the portfolio type is H the bank prefers to sell each loan as type h rather than
selling each loan as type l. (IC3) states that when the portfolio type is M the bank
prefers to sell the type h loan as type h and the type l loan as type l rather than
selling both loans as type h. (IC4) states that when the portfolio type is M the
bank prefers to sell the type h loan as type h and the type l loan as type l rather
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than selling both loans as type l. (IC5) states that when the portfolio type is L the
bank prefers to sell each loan as type l rather than one loan as type h and the other
as type l. (IC6) states that when the portfolio type is L the bank prefers to sell
each loan as type l rather than selling each loan as type h.
Comparing (IC1) and (IC2) it follows that if (IC2) is satisfied, so is (IC1). Com-
paring (IC5) and (IC6) it follows that if (IC6) is satisfied, so is (IC5). Subtracting
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) ph from both sides of (IC3) we obtain (IC2). Subtracting
βdlpilR + φ
(
1− dl) pl from both sides of (IC4) we obtain (IC6). QED
We can combine (IC2) and (IC6) to get
β
(
dh − dl) pihR ≥ φ ((1− dl) pl − (1− dh) ph ) ≥ β (dh − dl)pilR (A.1)
Step 2 ph ≥ pl.
Proof Given that bank’s payoff is increasing in ph and pl, in any signaling equilibrium at
least one of the two constraints described in Step 1 must bind. This is because we
can always increase both in such a way that leaves
(
1− dl) pl−(1− dh) ph constant.
If ph = βpihR, then the lemma is trivially satisfied. Suppose that pl = βpilR and
that βpilR > ph and that (A1) is satisfied. Then set ph = βpilR clearly increasing
the bank’s payoff. Given that βψR > 1, the second inequality is still satisfied.
Increasing ph also relaxes the first constraint and therefore we have a contradiction.
QED
Step 3 dl = 0.
Proof Given that pihR > pilR, (A1) implies that d
h > dl. Further, notice that if a
signaling equilibrium exists, Step 2 implies that the bank’s payoff will be decreasing
in dh and dl. Suppose that the first constraint is not binding. Then decrease dh
and dl by the same amount so that either dl = 0 or the first constraint binds.
Suppose that the second constraint is not binding. Then reduce dh and dl so that(
1− dl) pl−(1− dh) ph stays constant, so that either dl = 0 or the second constraint
binds. Then the lemma follows from the fact that at least one of the constraints is
not binding. QED
23
Step 3 and (A1) imply that
βdhpihR ≥ φ
(
pl −
(
1− dh) ph ) ≥ βdhpilR (A.2)
Step 4 pl = βpilR.
Proof Suppose not. Increasing pl relaxes the second constraint in (A2). Before we have
argued that if pl < βpilR, then it must be the case that ph = βpihR. Suppose that
the first constraint binds. Then increase pl and decrease d
h so that the constraint
remains binding. This is possible because reducing dh relaxes the constraint and
because (A2) implies that dh > 0. We have a contradiction. QED
Step 5 In a separating equilibrium the second constraint binds.
φ
(
pl −
(
1− dh) ph ) = βdhpilR (A.3)
Proof This follows from the fact that the payoff is increasing in ph and decreasing in d
h
and that reducing dh relaxes the first constraint in (A2). QED
Step 6 ph = βpihR.
Proof Solving (A3) for ph we get
ph =
(
1− 1
φ
dh
1− dh
)
βpilR.
Changes in ph and d
h affect the bank’s payoff only when it sells a loan of type h. Sub-
stituting the above expression in that payoff we obtain βdhpihR+ βpilR
(
(φ− 1) dh)
which is increasing in dh. Then the proof follows from dph/d(d
h) > 0. QED
Setting ph = βpihR in (A3) and solving for d
h completes the proof of the lemma. QED
8.2. Proof of Proposition 1
For the case when φ < pih/ψ we compare the two sales strategies for each portfolio
type separately.
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a) Type L portfolio.
The bank is indifferent between selling the loans separately or as a portfolio given that in
both cases its payoff will be equal to φβpilR.
b) Type M portfolio.
The bank’s payoff from selling the loans separately is equal to
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) βpihR + φβpilR = − (φ− 1)pihRdh + φ (pih + pil)R
and its payoff from selling them as portfolio is equal to
βdM (pih + pil)R + φ
(
1− dM) β (pih + pil)R = − (φ− 1) (pih + pil)RdM + φ (pih + pil)R.
Comparing the two payoffs we find that the bank will sell them separately if
pihRd
h − (pih + pil)RdM < 0.
Substituting the solution for dh from equation (3) and the solution for dM from the
statement of Lemma 3, it follows that
pihRd
h − (pih + pil)RdM = − φpil(pih − pil)
2
(φpih − pil) ((φpih − pil) + (φ− 1)pil) < 0.
Therefore, the bank will sell separately the two loans.
c) Type H portfolio.
The bank’s payoff from selling the loans separately is equal to
2
(
βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) βpihR) = 2 (− (φ− 1) pihRdh + φpihR)
and its payoff from selling them as portfolio is equal to
2
(
βdHpihR + φ
(
1− dH) βpihR) = 2 (− (φ− 1)pihRdH + φpihR)
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Clearly, the bank will sell them separately if dH − dh > 0. After some simple algebraic
manipulation:
dH − dh = (φ− 1) φpil(pih − pim)(pim − pil)
(φpih − pim)(φpih − pil)(φpim − pil) ,
which is positive because pih > pim > pil and φ > 1. Therefore, the bank will sell the two
loans separately using signaling.
Lastly, the proof of the second part of the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and
Lemma 4. QED
8.3. Proof of Proposition 2
1. piHM > ψ which implies that pih/piHM < pih/ψ.
2. piHL ≥ ψ if and only if θ ≥ 1/2, so that pih/piHL < pih/ψ if and only if θ ≥ 1/2.
3. We need to compare pim/piML and pih/ψ. It can be shown that
pim
piML
− pih
ψ
=
− (pih−pil)(1−θ)ψ
2ψ(θpih+pil)
< 0.Thus, pim/piML < pih/ψ.
Then, the result follows from φpiij ≥ pii, which is the necessary condition for the mixed
portfolio ij to be sold. QED
8.4. Proof of Theorem 1
First, comparing VS, given in equation (5), with UHM , given in equation (6), and
substituting for the conditional probability piHM , we have
9
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
(2ρH + ρM) pih
(
dHM − dh)+ ρMpildHM) . (A.4)
It is easily checked that dh > dHM . This is intuitive because the skin in the game
must be larger to signal a higher quality asset. In comparing the payoffs VS and UHM
therefore, there are two effects. The mixed portfolio has the benefit of using a lower skin
in the game whenever one or both loans are of high quality. Thus, the first term in the
brackets above, (2ρH + ρM)pih(d
HM − dh), is negative. However, the mixed portfolio also
9 For more detailed derivations please consult the Supplementary Appendix.
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has a cost if one of the loans is low quality, because the skin in the game dHM is still
required for the mixed pooling strategy where no skin in the game is required if loans
are completely separated. It can be shown that the latter effect dominates. That is,
ρMpild
HM > (2ρH + ρM)pih(d
h − dHM). Substituting for for dHM from equation (7) and
for dh from equation (3) (and for the probability piHM and pim) into equation (A.4) gives
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
φ(pih − pil)2ρMpil(2ρH + ρM)
(φpih − pil) ((2ρH + ρM) (φpih − pil) + ρMpil(φ− 1))
)
.
Since φ > 1 and pih > pil > 0 and ρM > 0, it follows that VS > UHM . Thus, the mixed
HM portfolio is always dominated by signaling.
Similarly, in comparing UML and VS, the skin in the game for the mixed portfolio
is only required if both loans are of high quality and the skin in the game dML is less
than the skin in the game, dh, required to signal the high quality when loans are signaled
separately. Thus, we have
UML − VS = (φ− 1)βRpih
(
2ρH(d
h − dML) + ρMdh
)
and since dh > dML > 0 (which follows from pih > piML > pil), φ > 1 we have UML > VS
and the mixed portfolio ML will be preferred to signaling loans separately if it is feasible.
When θ < 1/2, pooling all three portfolios dominates the mixed portfolio HL. There-
fore in comparing the mixed portfolio HL with other strategies, we only need to consider
the case θ ≥ 1/2. For θ ≥ 1/2, the mixed portfolio HL retains the skin in the game, dHL,
whenever both loans are of the high quality or both are of the low quality. The benefit of
this strategy relative to the separating strategy is given by
UHL − VS = (φ− 1)βR
(
pih (2ρH + ρM) d
h − (2pihρH + pilρL) dHL
)
= (φ− 1)βR (pih (2ρH + ρM) (dh − dHL)+ (pihρM − pilρL) dHL) .
Given that dHL < dh (which follows from the inequalities pih > piHL, pim > pil and φ > 1),
and ρM ≥ ρL for θ > 1/2 (and pih > pil), the above expression is always positive. Thus,
the mixed portfolio HL will be preferred to signaling loans separately if it is feasible.
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Finally, we compare the payoffs from the mixed portfolios HL and ML. The mixed
portfolio HL requires a skin in the game, dHL, whenever both loans are of the same
quality. In contrast the mixed portfolio ML requires a skin in the game, dML, only when
both loans are of high quality. However, the skin in the game required for the mixed
portfolio HL is lower than for the mixed portfolio ML: dHL < dML (this follows from the
inequalities pih > piHL, pim > piLM and φ > 1). Thus, we have
UHL − UML = (φ− 1)βR
(
2pihρH
(
dML − dHL)− 2pilρLdHL) . (A.5)
For θ = 1/2, dHL = 0, whereas dML > 0. Therefore for θ = 1/2, the difference UHL −
UML > 0 and by continuity there is a θ˜ such that for θ ∈ [1/2, θ˜) the difference is strictly
positive. In the limit as θ → 1, limθ→1 dHL > 0 whereas limθ→1(dML − dHL) = 0. Since
ρL → 0 as θ → 1, the difference UHL − UML → 0 as θ → 1. However, it can be checked
that the term ρH(d
ML − dHL) is declining in the limit whereas the term ρLdHL is nether
increasing nor decreasing in the limit as θ → 1. Thus, by continuity, there is a range
of θ, (θˆ, 1) where the difference UHL − UML > 0. We can conclude that there is a range
of θ where the mixed HL portfolio dominates the ML portfolio. This range may be the
interval [1/2, 1) or there may be some values of θ interior to this interval where the ML
portfolio dominates.
The skin in the game, for both mixed portfolios ML and HL, is decreasing in φ and
limφ→1 dHL → 1 and limφ→1 dML → 1 for θ ∈ (1/2, 1) (dHL = 0 for θ = 1/2). Thus, the
term in brackets in equation (A.5) is decreasing in φ and is negative in the limit as φ→ 1
for θ ∈ (1/2, 1). Therefore, it is possible to find a critical φc(θ) such that the bracketed
term is positive for φ > φc(θ). It can be shown that φc(θ) < pih/piHL for 1/2 ≤ θ <
(pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil) and that pi
c(θ) ∈ (pih/piHL, pih/ψ) for 1 > θ > (pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil).
Defining φc := maxθ φ
c(θ), it can be shown that
φc = 1 +
(pih − pil)
(√
pih(pih + pil)− pih
)
2pi2h
.
It is clear that since pih > pil, φ
c ≥ 1 with equality only if pil = 0. For φ > φc the difference
in (A.5) is positive and the mixed portfolio HL will dominate the mixed portfolio ML for
any θ ∈ [1/2, 1). It is also easily checked that φc < 2pih/(pih+pi1). Since pih/ψ and pih/piHL
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are decreasing in θ and pih/ψ > pih/piHL for θ > 1/2 with pih/ψ = pih/piHL = 2pih/(pih+pi1)
for θ = 1/2, it follows that there exist values of θ, pih and pil such that φ > φ
c and
pih/piHL ≤ φ < pih/ψ.
To complete the proof we note that the inequalities pih > pim and piHL <piML imply
that pim
piML
< pih
piHL
. Hence, considering each of the statements of the theorem in turn:
1. Follows from pim/piML < pih/piHL and the the necessary conditions φpiML ≥ pim and
φpiHL ≥ pih, that neither the mixed portfolio ML nor the mixed portfolio HL will be
sold for φ < pim/piML. Neither will the mixed portfolio HM be sold because, as we
have shown above, it is dominated by signaling of separate loan sales, VS > UHM .
2. For θ < 1/2, pih/ψ < pih/piHL and therefore the condition φpiHL ≥ pih for the
mixed portfolio HL to be sold is not satisfied. The mixed portfolio ML may be sold
because φ ≥ pim/piML and since UML > VS, this portfolio dominates separate loan
sales, which in turn dominates the mixed portfolio HM.
3. Since pim/piML < pih/piHL ≤ φ, the necessary conditions for the sale of the mixed
portfolios ML and HL are both satisfied. Since φ < pih/ψ, pooling does not dominate
these mixed portfolios. Since UML > VS and UHL > VS, both mixed portfolios are
better than signaling loans separately. The comparison of the two mixed portfolios
for θ ≥ 1/2 depends on the sign of UHL − UML, which as shown above is positive
for θ near to one and θ near to 1/2 and is such that for φ > φc, the mixed portfolio
HL dominates for all θ ∈ [1/2, 1).
4. Follows from the domination of the pooling strategy when φ ≥ pih/ψ.
QED
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9. Supplementary Appendix (not intended for publication)
9.1. Portfolio Sales
Let 2pi equal the price that the bank is willing to sell a portfolio of type i (that is pi
denotes half the portfolio price). Investor participation requires that
pH 6 βpihR, pM 6 βpimR ≡ βpiMR and pL 6 βpilR (S1)
Suppose that the bank’s portfolio type is type H. Under a signaling equilibrium, the
bank’s expected payoff from the sale of its portfolio is equal to 2
(
βdHpihR + φ
(
1− dH) pH ).
The interpretation is similar to that for the case for single loan sales. Similar argu-
ments show that the bank’s expected payoff when its portfolio is type M is equal to
2
(
βdMpimR + φ
(
1− dM) pM)and its expected payoff when its portfolio is type L is equal
to 2
(
βdLpilR + φ
(
1− dL) pL ).
The bank will prefer to sell a fraction of a type i portfolio to investors rather than
keeping it on its books if the following condition is satisfied:
βdipiiR + φ
(
1− di) pi ≥ βpiiR
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or
φpi ≥ βpiiR (S2)
where piH = pih, piM =
pih+pil
2
and piL = pil.
For signaling to be effective the following incentive compatibility constraints must also
be satisfied:
βdHpihR + φ
(
1− dH) pH ≥ βdMpihR + φ (1− dM) pM (SIC1)
βdHpihR + φ
(
1− dH) pH ≥ βdLpihR + φ (1− dL) pL (SIC2)
βdMpimR + φ
(
1− dM) pM ≥ βdHpimR + φ (1− dH) pH (SIC3)
βdMpimR + φ
(
1− dM) pM ≥ βdLpimR + φ (1− dL) pL (SIC4)
βdLpilR + φ
(
1− dL) pL ≥ βdMpilR + φ (1− dM) pM (SIC5)
βdLpilR + φ
(
1− dL) pL ≥ βdHpilR + φ (1− dH) pH (SIC6)
Each of the above expressions is equal to half the expected payoff of the corresponding
portfolio. (SIC1) states that when the portfolio type is H the bank prefers to sell it as
type H rather than selling it as type M . (SIC2) states that when the portfolio type is H
the bank prefers to sell it as type H rather than selling it as type L. (SIC3) states that
when the portfolio type is M the bank prefers to sell it as type M rather than selling it
as type H. (SIC4) states that when the portfolio type is M the bank prefers to sell it as
type M rather than selling it as type L. (SIC5) states that when the portfolio type is L
the bank prefers to sell it as type L rather than selling it as type M . (SIC6) states that
when the portfolio type is L the bank prefers to sell it as type L rather than selling it as
type H.
The constraints can be written as:
βpihR
(
dH − dM) ≥ φ ((1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) (SIC1*)
βpihR
(
dH − dL) ≥ φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH) (SIC2*)
βpimR
(
dH − dM) 6 φ ((1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) (SIC3*)
βpimR
(
dM − dL) ≥ φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) (SIC4*)
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βpilR
(
dM − dL) 6 φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) (SIC5*)
βpilR
(
dH − dL) 6 φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH) (SIC6*)
We can now prove Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
9.1.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Step S1 dH > dM > dL.
Proof The first inequality follows from (SIC1*) and (SIC3*). The second inequality
follows from (SIC4*) and (SIC5*). Notice that (SIC2*) and (SIC6*) also imply that
dH > dL. QED
Step S2 Any solution that satisfies (SIC1*), (SIC3*), (SIC4*) and (SIC5*) will also
satisfy (SIC2*) and (SIC6*).
Proof
βpihR
(
dH − dL) ≥ βpihR (dH − dM)+ βpimR (dM − dL) ≥
φ
((
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH + (1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) =
φ
((
1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH)
The second weak inequality follows from adding (SIC1*) and (SIC4*).
βpilR
(
dH − dL) 6 βpimR (dH − dM)+ βpilR (dM − dL) 6
φ
((
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH + (1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) =
φ
((
1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH)
The second weak inequality follows from adding (SIC3*) and (SIC5*). QED
We can combine (SIC1*) and (SIC3*) to get
βpihR
(
dH − dM) ≥ φ ((1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) ≥ βpimR (dH − dM) (S3)
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We can combine (SIC4*) and (SIC5*) to get
βpimR
(
dM − dL) ≥ φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) ≥ βpilR (dM − dL) (S4)
Step S3 pL 6 pM 6 pH .
Proof
a) Suppose that pL > pM . At least one of the following is true: the first constraint in
(S4) binds or pL = βpilR.
We first show that in both cases the fist constraint in (S3) must bind. Suppose that
pL = βpilR. Then pM < βpilR implies that the second constraint in (S4) does
not bind (given that it does not bind for pL = pM = βpilR). Given that bank’s
payoff is increasing in pM the first constraint in (S3) must bind. Next, suppose that
pL < βpilR. Then the first constraint in (S4) binds which implies that the second
constraint does not bind and, as before, it must be the case that the first constraint
in (S3) binds.
Decrease dM and pM so that the bank’s payoff βd
MpimR + φ
(
1− dM) pM remains con-
stant. Notice that Step S1 implies that dM > 0, and that if pM = 0, the first con-
straint in (S3) is not satisfied. Totally differentiating and rearranging we find that
the changes must satisfy dpM
d(dM )
= φpM−βpimR
φ(1−dM ) where the numerator must be positive
for the bank to be willing to sell a portfolio of type M . The change does not affect
(S4) but relaxes the first constraint in (S3). Therefore, we have a contradiction.
b) Suppose that pM > pH . The inequality pH < βpihR implies that the second constraint
in (S3) binds. It must also be true that pM < βpimR (given it does not bind for
pH = pM = βpimR). But then it follows that the second constraint in (S4) must
bind (if not increase pM , thus, raising the bank’s payoff). Increase d
M and pM so
that the second constraint still binds. But given that pimR > pilR the change relaxes
the second constraint in (S3) and also increases the bank’s payoff. Therefore, we
have a contradiction. QED
Step S4 dL = 0.
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Proof Suppose that the first constraint in (S4) does not bind. Then decrease dM and dL
by the same amount so that either dL = 0 or the first constraint binds. Suppose that
the second constraint is not binding. Then reduce dM and dL so that
(
1− dL) pL−(
1− dM) pM stays constant so that either dL = 0 or the second constraint binds.
Then, as long as the changes have not violated the constraints in (S3), the lemma
follows from the fact that at least one of the inequalities is not binding. If one of
the constraints in (S3) is violated, then decrease dH either by the same amount as
dM when the first constraint is the one that binds or decrease dH so that to keep(
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH constant if the second constraint is the one that binds.
QED
Step S5 In a signaling equilibrium the second constraint in (S3) and the second constraint
in (S4) bind. Further, pL = βpilR.
Proof Suppose that the second constraint in (S3) does not bind. Then we have pH =
βpihR. But then the constraint can be relaxed by decreasing d
H and thus increasing
the bank’s payoff. We have a contradiction. Next, suppose that the second con-
straint in (S4) does not bind. Then, it must be the case that the first constraint
in (S3) binds. If pM < βpimR, then increase pM till either the second constraint
binds or pM = βpimR. (This is feasible because the first constraint in (S3) does not
bind.) Thus, we have a contradiction. In contrast, if pM = βpimR, decrease d
M ,
thus, relaxing the constraint. We also have a contradiction. Given that the second
constraint in (S4) binds, we have pL = βpilR. QED
Then, a signaling equilibrium must satisfy (S2) and the following constraints:
φ
((
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) = βpimR (dH − dM) (S5)
and
φ
(
βpilR−
(
1− dM) pM) = βpilRdM (S6)
Step S6 pM = βpimR, pH = βpihR.
Proof
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a) Solve (S5) for pH to get
pH =
1− dM
1− dH pM +
β
φ
pimR
dH − dM
1− dH .
Changes in pH and d
H affect the bank’s payoff only when it sells a portfolio of type
H. Substituting the above expression in that payoff we obtain
βdHpihR + φ
((
1− dM) pM + β
φ
pimR
(
dH − dM))
which is increasing in dH . Then the first part of Step S6 follows from dpH
d(dH)
> 0.
b) Solve (S6) for pM to get
pM = βpilR
(
1
1− dM +
1
φ
dM
1− dM
)
.
Changes in pM and d
M affect the bank’s payoff only when it sells a portfolio of type
M . Substituting the above expression in that payoff we obtain
βdMpimR + φβpilR
(
1 +
1
φ
dM
)
which is increasing in dM . Then the second part of Step S6 follows from dpM
d(dM )
> 0.
QED
To complete the proof of the lemma substitute the results of Step S6 in (S5) and (S6).
Solve (S6) for dM . Then substitute the latter solution in (S5) and solve for dH .
dH =
φ
(
pih
pim
− 1
)
+ dM (φ− 1)
φ pih
pim
− 1
After substituting the solution for dM in the above expression and subtract the denomi-
nator from the numerator we find that the difference is equal to dM − 1 < 0 and therefore
dH < 1. Lastly, dH − dM = φ(
pih
pim
−1)(1−dM)
φ
pih
pim
−1 > 0. QED.
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9.1.2. Proof of Lemma 4
We consider the possibility of pooling equilibria. If a pooling equilibrium exists, then
the bank will not keep any fraction of the portfolio on its books. The maximum price
that investors would be willing to pay for a portfolio (assuming that the bank is willing
to sell all types of portfolios) is equal to 2βψR. If the bank keeps a type H portfolio on
its books, its payoff will be equal to 2βpihR. If the bank sells the portfolio to investors,
its payoff will be 2βφψR. Then, the bank will prefer to keep the portfolio on its books if
φ < pih
ψ
. Clearly, if the bank is willing to sell the type H portfolio, it will also be willing
to sell portfolios of types M and L. The above argument together with Lemma 3 and
(S2) imply that if φ < pih
ψ
, then the bank will sell the portfolio to investors using the skin
in the game as a signal.
Next, we need to compare signaling and pooling when φ ≥ pih
ψ
. The bank’s payoff from
pooling is equal to10
WP = VP = 2φβψR = 2φβ (θpih + (1− θ)pil)R.
The bank’s payoff from signaling when the loans are sold together as a portfolio is equal
to
WS = θ
22βpihR
(
dH + φ
(
1− dH))+
2θ (1− θ) β (pih + pil)R
(
dM + φ
(
1− dM))+ (1− θ)22βpilRφ.
WS − VP = −2θβpihR (φ− 1) dH − θ (1− θ) 2 (φ− 1) dM < 0.
QED.
9.2. Further Details of Proof of Theorem 1
In comparing the separate loans and portfolio HM we have (repeating (A.4))
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
(2ρH + ρM) pih
(
dHM − dh)+ ρMpildHM) .
10 The bank’s payoff from pooling does not depend on whether the loans are sold separately or as a
portfolio.
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Substituting for for dHM from equation (7) and for dh from equation (3) gives
VS−UHM = (φ−1)βR
(
φ(piHM − pil)pilρM
(φpiHM − pil) − pih
φ(pih − pil)
(φpih − pil) +
φ(piHM − pil)
(φpiHM − pil)(2ρH + ρM)
)
.
Substituting for the conditional probabilities piij and pim = (1/2)(pih + pil) gives
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
φ(pih − pil)2ρMpil(2ρH + ρM)
(φpih − pil) ((2ρH + ρM) (φpih − pil) + ρMpil(φ− 1))
)
,
as appears in the proof in the main text.
In comparing UHM and UML we have
UHL − UML = (φ− 1)βR
(
2pihρH
(
dML − dHL)− 2pilρLdHL) .
Substituting for dML and dHL gives
UHL − UML = (φ− 1)βRpilρLdHL
((
pihρH
pilρL
)(
dML − dHL
dHL
)
− 1
)
.
The sign of UHL − UML depends on the sign of the bracketed term. Substituting for dHL
and dML gives(
pihρH
pilρL
)(
dML − dHL
dHL
)
− 1 = pihρH(φ− 1)(pihpim − piHLpiML)
pilρL(piHL − pim)(φpih − piML) − 1.
Differentiating this term with respect to φ gives the derivative
pihρH(pih − piML)(pihpim − piHLpiML)
pilρL(piHL − pim)(φpih − piML)2 .
This is positive because pih > piML, piHL > pim and pihpim > piHLpiML. Hence, there will a
critical value of φ, φc such that UHL R UML and φ R φc. This critical value of φ depends
on parameters and in particular depends on θ because ρi is a function of θ. Hence, we
write φc(θ). Solving
pihρH(φ− 1)(pihpim − piHLpiML)
pilρL(piHL − pim)(φpih − piML) − 1 = 0
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gives
φc(θ) = 1+
pil(piHL − pim)(pih − piML)ρL
pih (pihpim − piHLpiML) ρH + pil (pim − piML) ρL = 1+
pil(pih − pil)(1− θ)(2θ − 1)
pih (pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2)
where the second equality follows from substituting for the the conditional probabilities
and for the probabilities ρi. It follows that φ
c(θ) > 1 for θ ∈ (1/2, 1) and φc(1/2) =
φc(1) = 1. We are interested in pih/piHL ≤ φ < pih/ψ. We have
pih
ψ
−φc(θ) = pih
pihθ + pil(1− θ)−φ
c(θ) =
(pih − pil)(1− θ)(pih(pih − pil)θ2 + pil(1− θ)(pih − pil(2θ − 1))
pih (pihθ + pil(1− θ)) (pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2) .
Since terms on the LHS are positive for θ ∈ [1/2, 1], we have φc(θ) < pih/ψ for θ ∈ [1/2, 1).
Equally,
φc(θ)− pih
piHL
= φc(θ)− θ
2 + (1− θ)2
pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2 =
(pih − pil)(1− θ) (pil(2θ − 1)− pih(1− θ))
pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2 .
The above term has the same sign as the sign of pil(2θ − 1)− pih(1− θ). Thus, we have
φc(θ)− pih
piHL
R 0 as θ R pih + pil
pih + 2pil
.
It is checked that 2/3 < (pih +pil)/(pih + 2pil) ≤ 1 with the second weak inequality holding
as equality only if pil = 1. It is possible to find the θ
∗ that maximizes φc(θ). Solving gives
θ∗ =
(pih − pil) +
√
pih(pih + pil)
3pih − pil .
Substituting into φc(θ) gives
φc := φc(θ∗) = 1 +
(pih − pil)
(√
pih(pih + pil)− pih
)
2pi2h
.
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The maximum value of φc occurs when pil = (1/9)(2
√
7 − 1)pih ≈ 0.476834pih. Hence,
substituting into the the formula for φc(θ∗) gives
φc ≤ 1
27
(
10 + 7
√
7
)
≈ 1.0563059.
40
